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Abstract—Next generation wireless architectures are expected
to enable slices of shared wireless infrastructure which are
customized to specific mobile operators/services. Given infras-
tructure costs and the stochastic nature of mobile services’
spatial loads, it is highly desirable to achieve efficient statistical
multiplexing amongst such slices. We study a simple dynamic
resource sharing policy which allocates a ‘share’ of a pool of
(distributed) resources to each slice–Share Constrained Propor-
tionally Fair (SCPF). We give a characterization of SCPF’s
performance gains over static slicing and general processor
sharing. We show that higher gains are obtained when a slice’s
spatial load is more ‘imbalanced’ than, and/or ‘orthogonal’ to, the
aggregate network load, and that the overall gain across slices is
positive. We then address the associated dimensioning problem.
Under SCPF, traditional network dimensioning translates to a
coupled share dimensioning problem, which characterizes the
existence of a feasible share allocation given slices’ expected
loads and performance requirements. We provide a solution to
robust share dimensioning for SCPF-based network slicing. Slices
may wish to unilaterally manage their users’ performance via
admission control which maximizes their carried loads subject
to performance requirements. We show this can be modeled as
a ‘traffic shaping’ game with an achievable Nash equilibrium.
Under high loads, the equilibrium is explicitly characterized, as
are the gains in the carried load under SCPF vs. static slicing.
Detailed simulations of a wireless infrastructure supporting
multiple slices with heterogeneous mobile loads show the fidelity
of our models and range of validity of our high load equilibrium
analysis.
I. INTRODUCTION
Next generation wireless systems are expected to embrace
SDN/NFV technologies towards realizing slices of shared
wireless infrastructure which are customized for specific mo-
bile services, e.g., mobile broadband, media, OTT service
providers, and machine-type communications. Customization
of network slices may include allocation of (virtualized) re-
sources (communication/computation), per-slice policies, per-
formance monitoring and management, security, accounting,
etc. The ability to deploy service specific slices is viewed, not
only as a mean to meet the diverse and sometimes stringent
demands of emerging services, e.g., vehicular, augmented
reality, but also as an approach for infrastructure providers to
reduce costs while developing new revenue streams. Resource
allocation virtualization in this context is more challenging
than for traditional cloud computing. Indeed, rather than
drawing on a centralized pool of resources, a network slice
requires allocations across a distributed pool of resources,
e.g., base stations. The challenge is thus to promote efficient
statistical multiplexing amongst slices over pools of shared
resources.
Network slices can be used to enable the sharing of network
resources amongst competing (possibly virtual) operators. In-
deed, the sharing of spectrum and infrastructure is viewed as
one way of reducing capital/operational costs and is already
being considered by standardization bodies, see [1], [2], which
have specified architectural and technical requirements, but
left the sharing criteria and algorithmic issues open. By
aggregating their traffic onto shared resources, it is expected
that operators could realize substantial savings, which might
justify/enable new shared investments in next generation tech-
nologies including 5G, mmWave and massive MIMO.
The focus of this paper is on resource sharing amongst
slices supporting stochastic (mobile) loads. A natural approach
to sharing is complete partitioning (see, e.g., [16]), which
we refer to as static slicing, whereby resources are statically
partitioned and allocated to slices, according to a service
level agreement, irrespective of slices’ instantaneous loads.
This offers each slice a guaranteed allocation at each base
station, and protection from each other’s traffic, but, as we
will see, poor efficiency. Other approaches include full sharing
(where all slices are served on a FCFS basis without resource
reservation), general processor sharing [24], which pre-assigns
a share to each slice, and allocate resource at each base station
proportionally to the shares among the slices which has active
users there. Instead, we advocate an alternative approach
wherein each slice is pre-assigned a fixed share of the pool
of resources, and re-distributes its share equally amongst its
active customers. In turn, each base station allocates resources
to customers in proportion to their shares. We refer to this shar-
ing model as Share Constrained Proportionally Fair (SCPF)
resource allocation. By contrast with static slicing, SCPF is
dynamic (since its resource allocations depend on the network
state) but constrained by the network slices’ pre-assigned
shares (which provides a degree of protection amongst slices).
Related work. There is an enormous amount of related work
on network resource sharing in the engineering, computer
science and economics communities. The standard framework
used in the design and analysis of communication networks
is utility maximization (see e.g., [28] and references there-
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in) which has led to the design of several transport and
scheduling mechanisms and criteria, e.g., the often considered
proportional fair criterion. The SCPF mechanism, described
above, should be viewed as a Fisher market where agents
(slices), which are share (budget) constrained, bid on network
resources, see, e.g., [23], and for applications [5], [10], [15].
The choice to re-distribute a slice’s share (budget) equally a-
mongst its users, can be viewed as a network mandated policy,
but also emerges naturally as the social optimal, market and
Nash equilibrium when slices exhibit (price taking) strategic
behavior in optimizing their own utility, see [9].
The novelty of our work lies in considering slice based
sharing, under stochastic loads and in particular studying
the expected performance resulting from such SCPF-based
resource allocations among coupled slices. Other researchers
who have considered performance of stochastic networks, e.g.,
[7], [12], and others, have studied networks where customers
are allocated resources (along routes) based on maximizing a
sum of customers utilities. These works focus on network sta-
bility for ‘elastic’ customers, e.g., file transfers. Subsequently
[8], [27] extended this line of work, to the evaluation of mean
file delays, but only under balanced fair resource allocations
(as a proxy for proportional fairness). Our focus here is
on SCPF-based sharing amongst slices with stochastic loads
and on ‘inelastic’ or ‘rate-adaptive’ customers, e.g., video,
voice, and more generally customers on properly provisioned
networks, whose activity on the network can be assumed to
be independent of their resource allocations.
Finally there is much ongoing work on developing the
network slicing concept, see e.g., [25], [32] and references
therein, including development of approaches to network virtu-
alization in RAN architectures, e.g, [11], [20], [26], and SDN-
based implementation, e.g., [6]. This paper focuses on devising
good slice-based resource sharing criteria to be incorporated
into such architectures.
Contributions of this paper. This paper makes several con-
tributions centering on a simple and practical resource sharing
mechanism: SCPF. First, we consider user performance (bit
transmission delay) on slices supporting stochastic loads. In
particular we develop expressions for (i) the mean perfor-
mance seen by a typical user on a network slice; and (ii) the
achievable performance gains versus static slicing (SS) and
general processor sharing (GPS). We show that when a slice’s
load is more ‘imbalanced’ than, and/or ‘orthogonal’ to, the
aggregate network load, one will see higher performance gains.
Our analysis provides an insightful picture of the ‘geometry’ of
statistical multiplexing for SCPF-based network slicing. Sec-
ond, under SCPF, traditional network dimensioning translates
to a coupled share dimensioning problem, which addresses
whether there exist feasible share allocations given slices’
expected loads and performance requirements. We provide a
solution to robust share dimensioning for SCPF-based network
slicing. Third, we consider decentralized per-slice performance
management under SCPF sharing. In particular, we consider
admission control aimed at maximizing a slice’s carried load
subject to a performance constraint. When slices unilaterally
optimize their admission control policies, the coupling of
their decisions can be viewed as a ‘traffic shaping’ game,
which is shown to have a Nash equilibrium. For a high
load regime we explicitly characterize the equilibrium and the
associated gains in carried load for SCPF versus static slicing.
Finally, we present detailed simulations for a shared distributed
infrastructure supporting slices with mobility patterns different
than that assumed in the theoretical analysis and more practical
SINR model. The results match our analysis well, which
further supports our conclusions on gains in both performance
and carried loads of SCPF sharing.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
A. Network Slices, Resources and Mobile Service Traffic
We consider a collection of base stations (sectors) B shared
by a set of network slices V , with cardinalities B and V
respectively. For example, V might denote slices supporting
different services or (virtual) mobile operators, etc.
We envisage each slice v providing a mobile service in the
region served by the base stations B. Each slice supports a
stochastic load of users (devices/customers) with an associated
mobility/handoff policy. In particular, we assume that exoge-
nous arrivals to slice v at base station b follow a Poisson
process with intensity γvb and let γ
v denote the (column) vector
of arrival intensities at each base station associated with slice
v, i.e. γv = (γvb : b ∈ B). Each slice v customer at base
station b has an independent sojourn time with mean µvb after
which it is randomly routed to another base station or exits
the system. As explained below we assume that such mobility
patterns do not depend on the resources allocated to users.
We let Qv = (qvi,j : i, j ∈ B) denote a slice-dependent routing
matrix where qvi,j is the probability a slice v customer moves
from base station i to j and 1−∑j∈B qvi,j is the probability it
exits the system. This model induces an overall traffic intensity
for slice v across base stations satisfying flow conservation
equations: for all b ∈ B we have
κvb = γ
v
b +
∑
a∈B
κvaq
v
a,b,
where κvb is the traffic intensity of slice v on base station b.
Accounting for users’ sojourn times, the mean offered load of
slice v on base station b is ρvb = κ
v
bµ
v
b , and ρ
v , (ρvb : b ∈ B)
captures its system load distribution. Letting µv = (µvb : b ∈
B), the flow conservation equations can be rewritten in matrix
form as:
ρv = diag(µv)(I − (Qv)T )−1γv. (1)
If Qv is irreducible, I − (Qv)T is irreducibly diagonally
dominant thus always invertible. Otherwise, we can always
find a permutation matrix of B, say P to make:
P T (I − (Qv)T )P =
A1 B1,2 . . .. . . ...
AK
 ,
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where K is the number of irreducible classes. Moreover, at
least one base station of each irreducible class has a nonzero
exiting probability, thus AK must be invertible. Then the
invertibility of I − (Qv)T follows.
This model corresponds to a multi-class network of
M/GI/∞ queues (base stations), where each slice corre-
sponds to a class of customers, see, e.g., [19]. Such networks
are known to have a product-form stationary distribution, i.e.,
the numbers of customers on slice v at base station b, denoted
by Nvb , are mutually independent and N
v
b ∼ Poisson(ρvb ).
Since the sum of independent Poisson random variables is
again Poisson, the total number of customers on slice v is such
that Nv =
∑
b∈BN
v
b ∼ Poisson(ρv) where ρv ,
∑
b∈B ρ
v
b .
Our network model for the numbers of customers and
mobility across base stations, assumes that customer so-
journ/activity/mobility are independent of the network state
and of the resources a customer is allocated. This is reason-
able for properly engineered slices where the performance a
customer sees does not impact its activity, e.g., inelastic or
rate adaptive applications seeing acceptable performance. This
covers a wide range of applications including voice, video
streaming, IoT monitoring, real-time control, and even, to
some degree, elastic web browsing sessions where users are
peak rate constrained and this constraint typically dictates their
performance.
There are several natural generalizations to this model
including class-based routing and user sessions (e.g. web
browsing) which are not always active at the base stations
they visit, see, e.g., [19].
B. Network Slice Resource Sharing
In the sequel we consider a setting where the resources
allocated to a slice’s customers depend on the overall network
state, i.e., number of customers each slice has on each base
station, corresponding to the stochastic process described in
Section II-A. Let us consider a snapshot of the system’s state
and let Uvb ,Ub,Uv , and U denote sets of active customers on
slice v at base station b, at base station b, on slice v, and
on the overall network, respectively. Thus, the cardinalities of
these sets correspond to a realization of the system ‘state’, i.e.,
|Uvb | = nvb and |Uv| = nv , where in a stationary regime nv
and nvb are realizations of Poisson random variables N
v and
Nvb , respectively.
Each base station b is modeled as a finite resource shared
by its associated users Ub. A customer u ∈ Ub can be allocated
a fraction fu ∈ [0, 1] of that resource, e.g., of resource blocks
in a given LTE frame, or allocated the resource for a fraction
of time, where
∑
u∈Ub fu = 1. We shall neglect quantization
effects. The transmission rate to customer u, denoted by ru,
is then given by ru = fucu where cu denotes the current
peak rate for that user. To model customer heterogeneity across
slices/base stations we shall assume cu for a typical customer
on slice v at base station b is an independent realization of
a random variable, denoted by Cvb , whose distribution may
depend on the slice, since slices may support different types
of customer devices (e.g., car connectivity vs. mobile phone)
and depend on the base station, since typical slice v users may
have different spatial distributions with respect to base station
b or see different levels of interference.
Below we consider three resource allocation schemes; the
first two are used as benchmarks, while the third is the one
under study in this paper. For all we assume each slice is
allocated a ‘share’ of the network resources sv, v ∈ V such
that sv > 0 and
∑
v∈V s
v = 1.
Definition 1. Static Slicing (SS): Under SS, slice v is allo-
cated a fixed fraction sv of each base station b’s resources,
and each customer u ∈ Uvb gets an equal share, i.e., 1/nvb ,
of the slice v’s resources at base station b. Thus the users
transmission rate rSSu is given by
rSSu =
sv
nvb
cu.
Definition 2. General Processor Sharing (GPS): [24] Under
GPS, each active slice v at base station b such that nvb > 0
is allocated a fraction of the base station b’s resources
proportionally to its share sv . Thus a user u ∈ Uvb sees a
transmission rate rGPSu given by
rGPSu =
sv
nvb
∑
v′∈V sv
′1{nv′b >0}
cu. (2)
Definition 3. Share Constrained Proportionally Fair
(SCPF): Under SCPF each slice re-distributes its share of
the overall network resources equally amongst its active
customers, which thus get a weight (sub-share) wu = s
v
nv
for
u ∈ Uv,∀v ∈ V. In turn, each base station allocates resources
to customers in proportion to their weights. So a user u ∈ Uvb
gets a transmission rate rSCPFu given by
rSCPFu =
wu∑
u′∈Ub wu′
cu =
sv
nv∑
v′∈V
nv
′
b sv′
nv′
cu. (3)
A simple example illustrating the differences among three
schemes is exhibited in Table I. Suppose there are two base
stations, i.e., B = {b1, b2}, and two slices V = {1, 2} each
with an equal share of the network resource. Consider a
snapshot of the system where Users u1, u2 are on Slice 1
and u3, u4 are on Slice 2. Also, u1, u2, and u3 are at base
station b1 and u4 is at base station b2. Let us assume for
simplicity that cu = 1,∀u ∈ U . In this case, under SS at b1
the two users on Slice 1 need to share 12 of the resource while
u3 on Slice 2 is allocated the other 12 , while at b2, half of the
resource is wasted due to the absence of active users on Slice
1. By contrast, GPS utilizes all resources at b2 by allocating
all of them to u4, and it makes the same allocation as SS at b1.
Under SCPF, because each user is allocated the same weight
1
4 , at b1, three users are allocated the same rate
1
3 and at b2
all bandwidth is given to u4. This example shows how SCPF
achieves better network-wide fairness than GPS and SS, while
ensuring that resources are not wasted.
Indeed, under SCPF the overall fraction of resources slice
v is allocated at base station b is proportional to n
v
b
nv s
v , i.e.,
3
TABLE I: Rate allocation under different schemes
User association Rate allocation
Slice 1 Slice 2 SS GPS SCPF
b1
u1
1
4
1
4
1
3
u2
1
4
1
4
1
3
u3
1
2
1
2
1
3
b2 u4
1
2
1 1
its share times its relative number of users at the base station.
This provides a degree of elasticity to variations in the slice’s
spatial loads. However, if a slice has a large number of cus-
tomers, its customers’ weights are proportionally decreased,
which protects other slices from such overloads. Note that
SCPF requires minimal information exchanges among base
stations and is straightforward to implement, e.g., using SDN-
like framework.
III. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section we study the expected performance seen by
a slice’s typical customer. Given our focus on inelastic/rate
adaptive traffic and tractability, we choose our customer per-
formance metric as the reciprocal transmission rate, referred
to as the Bit Transmission Delay (BTD), see, e.g., [30]. This
corresponds to the time taken to transmit a ‘bit’, so lower
BTDs indicate higher rates and thus better performances.
BTD is a high-level metric capturing the instantaneous QoS
perceived by a user, e.g., short packet transmission delays
are roughly proportional to the BTD. By guaranteeing a
good BTD we can guarantee that the user perceived QoS
is acceptable all the time, instead of in an average sense.
Alternatively, the negative of the BTD can be viewed as a
concave utility function of the rate, which in the literature
(see, e.g., [22]) was referred to as the potential delay utility.
Concave utility functions tend to favor allocations that exhibit
reduced variability in a stochastic setting. Given the stochastic
loads on the network, we shall evaluate the average BTD seen
by a typical (i.e., randomly selected) customer on a slice, i.e.,
averaged over the stationary distribution of the network state
and transmission capacity seen by typical users, e.g., Cvb , at
each base station. Such averages naturally place higher weights
on congested base stations, where a slice may have more users,
best reflecting the overall performance customers will see.
A. Analysis of BTD Performance
Consider a typical customer on slice v and let Ev denote the
expectation of the system state as seen by such a customer,
i.e., under the Palm distribution [4]. For SCPF, we let Rv
be a random variable denoting the rate of a typical customer
on slice v, and Rvb that of such customer on slice v at base
station b. Similarly, let Rv,SS , Rv,SSb , R
v,GPS , and Rv,GPSb
denote these quantities under SS and GPS, respectively. Thus,
under SCPF the average BTD for a typical slice v customer
is given by Ev[ 1Rv ]. The next result characterizes the mean
BTD under SCPF, SS, and GPS under our traffic model. We
introduce some further notation:
• Overall average number of users on slice v: ρv = E[Nv].
• Load distribution of slice v: ρv , (ρvb : b ∈ B), where
ρvb = E[Nvb ].
• Relative load distribution of slice v: ρ˜v , (ρ˜vb : b ∈ B),
where ρ˜vb =
ρvb
ρv .
• Overall share weighted relative load distribution: g˜ ,
(g˜b : b ∈ B), where g˜b =
∑
v∈V s
vρ˜vb .
• Active share weighted relative load distribution: g˜′ ,
(g˜′b : b ∈ B), where g˜′b =
∑
v∈V s
v(1 − e−ρv )ρ˜vb . If
a slice is inactive, i.e., not having any customer in the
network, then its share should be voided. (1 − e−ρv ) is
the probability that slice v has at least 1 active user in
the network.
• Vector of idle shares seen by a typical user on s-
lice v: s¯v , (s¯vb : b ∈ B), where s¯vb =
Ev
[∑
v′ 6=v s
v′1{Nv′b =0}
]
=
∑
v′ 6=v s
v′e−ρ
v′
b represents
how much share is voided seen by slice v, due to the
absence of active users at base station b. Also we define
Sv = diag(s¯v).
• Mean reciprocal capacity of slice v: δv , (δvb : b ∈ B),
where δvb = Ev[
1
Cvb
]. Also we define ∆v = diag(δv).
We use 〈x1,x2〉M , xT1Mx2 to denote the weighted inner
product of vectors, where M is a diagonal matrix. Also, we
use ‖x‖M ,
√
xTMx to denote the weighted norm of a
vector, where M is a diagonal matrix. In both cases, when M
is the identity matrix I we simply omit it. In addition, ‖x‖2
and ‖x‖1 denote the L2-norm and L1-norm of x, respectively.
Theorem 1. For network slicing based on SCPF, the mean
BTD for a typical customer on slice v is given by
Ev
[
1
Rv
]
=
∑
b∈B
ρ˜vbδ
v
b
(
1− ρ˜vb + (ρv + 1)
(
g˜′b
sv
+ e−ρ
v
ρ˜vb
))
. (4)
If (ρ˜v : v ∈ V) are fixed, and (ρv : v ∈ V) are large, then
the mean BTD has following asymptotic form:
Ev
[
1
Rv
]
u
ρv
sv
〈ρ˜v, g˜〉∆v +O(1) (5)
For network slicing based on SS, the mean BTD for a typical
customer on slice v is given by
Ev
[
1
Rv,SS
]
=
∑
b∈B
ρ˜vbδ
v
b
(
ρvb + 1
sv
)
. (6)
For network slicing based on GPS, the mean BTD for a typical
customer on slice v is given by
Ev
[
1
Rv,GPS
]
=
∑
b∈B
ρ˜vbδ
v
b
(
ρvb + 1
sv
)
(1− s¯vb ) . (7)
Please see appendix for the detailed proof. BTD under all 3
schemes increases with the overall load ρv and decreases with
the share sv when (ρ˜v : v ∈ V) are fixed. Their dependencies
on relative loads (ρ˜v : v ∈ V) are different, implying that
they exploit statistical multiplexing differently.
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B. Analysis of Gain
Using the results in Theorem 1 one can evaluate the gains
in the mean BTD for a typical slice v user under SCPF vs.
SS, defined as,
GSSv ,
Ev
[
1
Rv,SS
]
Ev
[
1
Rv
] .
In general, one would expect GSSv ≥ 1 since under SCPF
typical users should see higher allocated rates and thus lower
BTDs. One can verify that is the case when slices have uniform
loads across base stations but the general case is more subtle.
Similarly, we define the gain of SCPF vs. GPS by
GGPSv ,
Ev
[
1
Rv,GPS
]
Ev
[
1
Rv
] .
By taking the ratio of the mean BTD perceived by a typical
customer under SS and that under SCPF given in Theorem 1,
we have the following corollary.
Corollary 1. The BTD gain of SCPF over SS for slice v is
given by
GSSv =
ρv‖ρ˜v‖2∆v+〈δv,ρ˜v〉
sv〈δv,ρ˜v〉−sv(1−(ρv+1)e−ρv )‖ρ˜v‖2
∆v
+(ρv+1)〈g˜′,ρ˜v〉∆v (8)
For fixed relative loads (ρ˜v : v ∈ V), when slice v has a light
load, i.e., ρv → 0, the gain is greater than 1 and given by:
GSS,Lv =
〈δv, ρ˜v〉
sv〈δv, ρ˜v〉+ 〈g˜′, ρ˜v〉∆v > 1
Furthermore, GSSv is a nonincreasing function of ρ
v , and if
all slices have high overall loads, i.e., ρv → ∞,∀v ∈ V , the
gain is given by:
GSS,Hv =
‖ρ˜v‖2∆v
〈g˜, ρ˜v〉∆v .
The result indicates that when the relative loads are fixed,
the gain decreases with the overall load ρv , thus if GSS,Hv > 1
SCPF always provides a gain. Let us consider the heavy load
gain under the following simplifying assumption.
Assumption 1. Base stations are said to be homogeneous for
slice v if for all b ∈ B: Ev
[
1
Cvb
]
= δv.
Assumption 1 only requires the average reciprocal capacity
a given slices’ customer sees across base stations is homoge-
nous. In this case, the BTD gain for slice v under heavy load
simplifies to
GSS,Hv =
‖ρ˜v‖2
‖g˜‖2 ×
1
cos(θ(g˜, ρ˜v))
,
where θ(g˜, ρ˜v) denotes the angle between the slice’s relative
load and the overall share weighted relative load on the
network. A sufficient condition for gains under high loads
is that ‖g˜‖2 ≤ ‖ρ˜v‖2. Since ‖g˜‖1 = ‖ρ˜v‖1 = 1, this
follows when the overall share weighted relative load on the
network is more balanced than that of slice v. One would
typically expect aggregated traffic to be more balanced than
that of individual slices. This condition is fairly weak, i.e., it
does not depend on where the loads are placed, but on how
balanced they are. The corollary also suggests that gains are
higher when cos(θ(g˜, ρ˜v)) is smaller. In other words, a slice
with imbalanced relative loads whose relative load distribution
is ‘orthogonal’ to the shared weighted aggregate traffic, i.e.,
cos(θ(g˜, ρ˜v)) ≈ 0, will tend to see higher gains. This is due to
that SCPF can achieve sharing elasticity by aligning resource
allocations with demands, i.e., load distributions. Thus when
the load distributions are nearly orthogonal, sharing under
SCPF is much better than that under SS, which is completely
inelastic. The simulations in Section VI further explore these
observations.
Similarly, for the BTD gain of SCPF over GPS, we have
following result:
Corollary 2. The BTD gain of SCPF over GPS for slice v is
given by
GGPSv =
ρv(‖ρ˜v‖2∆v−‖ρ˜v‖2∆vSv )+〈ρ˜v,1−s¯v〉∆v
sv〈δv,ρ˜v〉−sv(1−(ρv+1)e−ρv )‖ρ˜v‖2
∆v
+(ρv+1)〈g˜′,ρ˜v〉∆v . (9)
For fixed relative loads (ρ˜v : v ∈ V), and fixed overall loads
for other slices (ρv
′
: v′ 6= v), the gain for slice v under low
overall load, ρv → 0, is given by:
GGPS,Lv =
〈ρ˜v,1− s¯v〉∆v
sv〈δv, ρ˜v〉+ 〈g˜′, ρ˜v〉∆v .
Furthermore, if all slices have low load ρv → 0,∀v ∈ V , then
GGPS,Lv → 1
Also, if all slices have high loads, i.e., ρv →∞,∀v ∈ V , the
BTD gain over GPS for slice v is given by:
GGPS,Hv =
‖ρ˜v‖2∆v − ‖ρ˜v‖2∆vSv
〈g˜, ρ˜v〉∆v .
Please see appendix for detailed proof. Note that when
(ρ˜v : v ∈ V) are fixed and ∀v, b, ρ˜vb > 0, under heavy
load, i.e., ρv → ∞,∀v ∈ V , we have s¯v → 0, thus
‖ρ˜v‖2∆v−‖ρ˜v‖2∆vSv → ‖ρ˜v‖2∆v , which means GPS obtains a
similar performance as SS under heavy load. However, unlike
the gain over SS, GGPS,Lv might not be strictly greater than 1
and GGPSv might not be monotonic in ρ
v .
One can observe that, different slices can experience differ-
ent BTD gains, depending on its share and load distributions.
However, to compare the performances of different sharing
criteria, a network-wide metric of gain needs to be defined. To
be able to compare scenarios with different load distributions
and shares, it is of particular interest to consider a metric which
is robust against changes of load and share. To devise such a
metric, we note that users who are perceiving a low average
capacity from their associated base stations, and/or users
whose allocated shares are small are expected to experience
higher BTDs. Thus to achieve the robustness of the metric, let
us define the normalized BTD for a typical user on slice v at
base station b under SCPF as
E¯v
[
1
Rvb
]
, 1
δvb
sv
ρv
Ev[
1
Rvb
], (10)
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and thus the normalized BTD for a typical user on slice v
under SCPF is given by
E¯v
[
1
Rv
]
=
∑
b∈B
ρ˜vb E¯v
[
1
Rvb
]
. (11)
Similarly, one can define E¯v
[
1
Rv,SSb
]
, E¯v
[
1
Rv,SS
]
, and
E¯v
[
1
Rv,GPSb
]
, E¯v
[
1
Rv,GPS
]
. For the overall performance of
the system, let us consider the share weighted sum of the
normalized BTD since the system should be tuned to put
more emphasis on the slices with higher shares, and define
the overall weighted BTD gain of SCPF over SS as
GSSall ,
∑
v∈V s
vE¯v
[
1
Rv,SS
]∑
v∈V svE¯v
[
1
Rv
] , (12)
and the overall weighted BTD gain of SCPF over GPS as
GGPSall ,
∑
v∈V s
vE¯v
[
1
Rv,GPS
]∑
v∈V svE¯v
[
1
Rv
] , (13)
The following results capture the overall weighted BTD
gains.
Corollary 3. When ρv → ∞,∀v ∈ V , the overall weighted
BTD gains of SCPF over SS and GPS under heavy load are
given by
GSS,Hall =
∑
v∈V s
v‖ρ˜v‖22∑
v∈V sv〈g˜, ρ˜v〉
, GGPS,Hall =
∑
v∈V s
v‖ρ˜v‖2I−Sv∑
v∈V sv〈g˜, ρ˜v〉
,
(14)
and
GSS,Hall ≥ 1, GGPS,Hall ≥ 1.
Please see appendix for detailed proof. It is easy to see that
if ρ˜v are the same for all v ∈ V , then both GSS,Hall and GGPS,Hall
are 1 when the loads are heavy. By contrast, if the relative
loads of different slices are (approximately) all orthogonal,
i.e. , 〈ρ˜v, ρ˜v′〉 u 0, v 6= v′ and each slice has the same share
sv = 1V ,∀v ∈ V , the overall gain can be as high as V .
IV. SHARE DIMENSIONING UNDER SCPF
In practice each slice v may wish to provide service
guarantees to its customers, i.e., ensure that the mean BTD
does not exceed a performance target dv . Below we investigate
how to dimension network shares to support slice loads subject
to such mean BTD requirements.
Henceforth we shall assume the following assumption is in
effect.
Assumption 2. The network is said to see high overall slice
loads, if for all v ∈ V we have ρv  1.
Consider a network supporting the traffic loads of a single
slice, say v, so sv = 1 and g˜ = ρ˜v . Note that 〈ρ˜v, δv〉 is the
minimum average BTD achievable across the network when a
slice gets all the base station resources, so a target requirement
satisfies dv > 〈ρ˜v, δv〉. For slice v to meet a mean BTD
constraint dv , it follows from Eq. (5) that:
ρv ≤ l(dv, ρ˜v, δv) , dv − 〈ρ˜
v, δv〉
‖ρ˜v‖2∆v
.
We can interpret l(dv, ρ˜v, δv) as the maximal admissible
carried load ρv given a fixed relative load distribution ρ˜v ,
BTD requirement dv , and mean reciprocal capacities δv . As
might be expected, if the relative load distribution ρ˜v is more
balanced (normalized by the mean base station capacity), i.e.,
‖ρ˜v‖2∆v is smaller, or if the BTD constraint is relaxed, i.e.,
dv is higher, or the base station capacities scale up, i.e., δv is
smaller, the slice can carry a higher overall load ρv .
Next, let us consider SCPF based sharing amongst a set
of slices V each with its own BTD requirements. It follows
from Eq. (5) that to meet such requirements on each slice the
following should hold: for all v ∈ V
sv ≥ 1 + ρ
v
l(dv, ρ˜v, δv)− ρv
∑
u6=v
su
〈ρ˜v, ρ˜u〉∆v
‖ρ˜v‖2∆v
. (15)
This can be written as:∑
v∈V
svhv  0, (16)
where we refer to hv = (hvu : u ∈ V) as v’s share coupling
vector, given by
hvu =
{
1 v = u
− 1+ρul(du,ρ˜u,δu)−ρu
〈ρ˜u,ρ˜v〉∆u
‖ρ˜u‖2
∆u
v 6= u,
We can interpret hvv = 1 as the benefit to slice v of allocating
unit share to itself. When v 6= u, hvu depends on two factors.
The first 1+ρ
u
l(du,ρ˜u,δu)−ρu captures the sensitivity of slice u to
the ‘share weighted congestion’ from other slices. If ρu is
close to its limit l(du, ρ˜u, δu), its sensitivity is naturally very
high. The second term, 〈ρ˜
u,ρ˜v〉∆u
‖ρ˜u‖2
∆u
captures the impact of slice
v’s load distribution on slice u. Note that if two slices load
distributions are orthogonal, they do not affect each other.
The following result summarizes the above analysis.
Theorem 2. There exists a share allocation such that slice
loads and BTD constraints ((ρv, ρ˜v, dv) : v ∈ V) are
admissible under SCPF sharing if and only if there exists an
s = (sv : v ∈ V) such that ‖s‖1 = 1, s  0 and∑
v∈V
svhv  0.
Admissibility can then be verified by solving the following
maxmin problem:
max
s0
{ min
i
∑
v∈V
svhvi : ‖s‖1 = 1 }. (17)
If the optimal objective function is positive, the traffic pattern
is admissible. Moreover, if there are multiple feasible share
allocations, then the optimizer is a ‘robust’ choice in that it
maximizes the minimum share given to any slice, giving slices
margins to tolerate perturbations in the slice loads satisfying
Eq. (16).
If a set of network slice loads and BTD constraints are
not admissible, admission control will need to be applied. We
discuss this in the next section.
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V. ADMISSION CONTROL AND TRAFFIC SHAPING GAMES
A natural approach to managing performance in overloaded
systems is to perform admission control. In the context of
slices supporting mobile services where spatial loads may vary
substantially, this may be unavoidable. Below we consider ad-
mission control policies that adapt to changes in load. Specif-
ically, an admission control policy for slice v is parameterized
by av , (avb : b ∈ B) ∈ [0, 1]B where avb is the probability a
new customer at base station b is admitted. Such decisions are
assumed to be made independently thus admitted customers
for slice v at base station b still follow a Poisson Process with
rate γvb a
v
b . Based on the flow conservation equation Eq. (1) one
can obtain the carried load ρv induced by admission control
policy av via
ρv = (Mv)−1av = diag(µv)(I − (Qv)T )−1diag(γv)av
where Mv , diag(γv)−1(I−(Qv)T )diag(µv)−1 is invertible
because I − (Qv)T is irreducibly diagonally dominant.1 By
contrast with Section II-A, note that ρv now represents the
load after admission control, which may have a reduced overall
load and possibly changed relative loads across base stations–
i.e., shape the traffic on the slice. We also let g˜ be the
overall share weighted relative loads after admission control,
see Section III-A. Note that we have assumed only exogenous
arrivals can be blocked, thus once a customer is admitted it
will not be dropped–the intent is to manage performance to
maintain service continuity.
Below we consider a setting where slices unilaterally opti-
mize their admission control policies in response to network
congestion, rather than a single joint global optimization. The
intent is to allow slices (which may correspond to competing
virtual operators/services) to optimize their own performance,
and/or enable decentralization in settings with SCPF based
sharing.
For simplicity we assume that assumption 1 holds true
throughout this section, and define the capacity normalized
mean BTD requirement d˜v , dvδv . Suppose each slice v
optimizes its admission control policy so as to maximize its
overall carried load ρv , i.e., the average number of active users
on the network, subject to a normalized mean BTD constraint
d˜v . Under Assumption 1 the optimal policy for slice v is the
solution to the following optimization problem:
max
ρ˜v,ρv
ρv (18)
s.t. av = ρvMvρ˜v, av ∈ [0, 1]B , 〈1, ρ˜v〉 = 1 (19)
(ρv + 1)
sv
〈g˜, ρ˜v〉 −
(
1− (ρv + 1)e−ρv
)
‖ρ˜v‖22
≤ d˜v − 1 (20)
Note that Eq. (19) establishes a one-to-one mapping be-
tween (ρ˜v, ρv) and av . We will use ρ˜v and ρv to parameterize
admission control decisions for slice v. The BTD constraint in
1If γv is not strictly positive one can reduce the dimensionality.
Eq. (20) follows from Eq. (5). Also note that this admission
control policy depends on both the overall share weighted
loads on the network g˜, the slice’s load and its customer
mobility patterns (i.e., Mv). Unfortunately, for general loads
ρv , this problem is not convex due to the BTD constraint
Eq. (20); however, for high overall per slice loads it is easily
approximable by a convex function.
Under Assumption 2 we have that 1 + ρv ≈ ρv and the left
hand side of Eq. (20) becomes:
(ρv + 1)
sv
〈g˜, ρ˜v〉 − ‖ρ˜v‖22 ≈
ρv
sv
〈g˜, ρ˜v〉 = (svxv)−1〈g˜, ρ˜v〉
(21)
where we have defined xv , (ρv)−1. Further defining ρ˜−v ,
(ρ˜v
′
: v′ ∈ V\{v}), Eq. (20) can be replaced by:
fv(ρ˜
v; ρ˜−v) , 〈g˜, ρ˜v〉 ≤ sv(d˜v − 1)xv. (22)
Thus, by defining yv , (ρ˜v, xv), which is equivalent to
(ρ˜v, ρv), together with y−v , (yv′ : v′ ∈ V\{v}), each
slice can unilaterally optimize its admission control policy by
solving the following problem:
Admission control for slice v under SCPF (ACv): Given
other slices’ admission decisions y−v , slice v determines its
admission control policy yv = (ρ˜v, xv) by solving
min
yv
{ xv | yv ∈ Y v(y−v) } (23)
where Y v(y−v) denotes slice v’s feasible policies and is given
by
Y v(y−v) , { yv | 〈1, ρ˜v〉 = 1, 0 Mvρ˜v  xv1,
fv(ρ˜
v; ρ˜−v) ≤ sv(d˜v − 1)xv }. (24)
Note that ACv is coupled to the decisions of other slices
through the feasible set Yv(y−v). Thus, one cannot indepen-
dently solve each slice’s admission control problem to obtain
an efficient solution. Furthermore, devising a global optimiza-
tion for all slices brings both complexity and nonconvexity
from the BTD constraints. A natural approach requiring mini-
mal communication and cooperation overhead is to consider a
game setup where network slices are players, each seeking to
maximize their carried loads (and the corresponding revenue)
subject to BTD constraints.
We formally define the traffic shaping game for a set of
network slices V as follows. We let y , (yv : v ∈ V) denote
the simultaneous strategies of all slices (given by the respective
admission control policies). As in ACv , each slice v picks a
feasible strategy, i.e., yv ∈ Y v(y−v) to minimize its objective
function θv(yv,y−v) , xv . Note in the sequel we will modify
θv(·, ·) to ensure the games convergence. A Nash equilibrium
is a simultaneous strategy y∗ such that no slice can unilaterally
improve its carried load, i.e., for all v ∈ V
θv(y
v,∗,y−v,∗) ≤ θv(yv,y−v,∗), ∀yv ∈ Y v(y−v,∗).
The following result follows from Theorem 3.1 in [13].
Theorem 3. The traffic shaping game defined above has a
Nash equilibrium.
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Note that at the Nash equilibrium, no slice can unilaterally
improve its performance. Therefore, finding the Nash equi-
librium is also a way to achieve fairness under our sharing
scheme. In the next subsection, we will design an algorithm
to achieve such allocation.
A. Algorithm
In our setting finding the Nash equilibrium is not a simple
matter. The difficulty arises from the fact that slices’ strategy
spaces depend on other’s choices, so oscillation is possible.
In the literature such settings are specifically referred to as
Generalized Nash Equilibrium Problem (GNEP), see, e.g., [14]
and [29]. However, the algorithm proposed in [14] assumed an
algorithm capable of solving a penalized unconstrained Nash
Equilibrium Problem, which satisfies a set of conditions, and
that in [29] relies on the convexity of the joint strategy space.
Thus none of them can be directly applied in our setting.
Below we propose an algorithm involving slices and a central
entity which is guaranteed to converge to the equilibrium.
We summarize the main ideas as follows. To decouple
dependencies among strategy spaces, we shall move slice v’s
BTD constraint into its objective function as a penalty term
with an associated multiplier λv . Let λ , (λv : v ∈ V).
By adjusting the value of λ according to y at each iteration,
one can determine a setting such that, at the induced Nash
Equilibrium, all slices meet their BTD constraints, and the
equilibrium is identical to that of the traffic shaping game. In
addition, in order to prevent overshooting, at each iteration
each slice’s objective function is regularized by the distance
to the previous reciprocal carried load xv.
Specifically, the admission control strategy of slice v in
response to other slices is now given as the solution to the
following optimization problem:
Lv (y;λ
v) = argmin
(yv)′∈Y¯ v
θv((y
v)′,y−v;λv)+

2
(xv−x′v)2, (25)
where we define a BTD penalty function for slice v as
hv(y) , fv(ρ˜v; ρ˜−v)− sv(d˜v − 1)xv.
and the objective function for slice v is now (different
from what is previously defined): θv(yv,y−v;λv) , exv +
λv[hv(y)]+, with [x]+ , max(0, x). The last term in Eq. (25)
serves as a regularization term. The strategy space is now
Y¯ v , {yv|〈1, ρ˜v〉 = 1,0  Mvρ˜v  xv1} and xv is
substituted by exv to ensure strong convexity, which is required
for convergence (note that due to the monotonicity, exv and
xv should result in the same optimizer).
We propose to use the inexact line search update introduced
in [29]. In order to make sure the iteration is proceeding
towards the equilibrium, we use
Ω(y;λ) ,
∑
v∈V
θv(y
v,y−v;λv)− θv(Lv (y;λ),y−v;λv)
− 
2
(xv − x′v)2 ≥ 0
as a metric, observing that the equilibrium is given by y∗ if and
only if Ω(y∗;λ) = 0. Therefore we seek to decrease Ω(y;λ)
by a sufficient amount at each iteration. The task executed by
each slice v is given in Algorithm 1, while the central entity,
which is responsible for collecting and delivering information
and updating λ, executes Algorithm 2. This then follows the
algorithm proposed in [14].
Algorithm 1 Algorithm of Slice v
1: Set k ← 0 and collect  from central entity.
2: Receive λv(k) and y(k) from central entity.
3: Compute Lv (y(k);λ) and transmit it back to the central
entity. Set k ← k + 1. Go to step 2
Algorithm 2 Penalized Update in Central Entity
1: Choose a starting point y(0), λ(0)  0, ηv ∈ (0, 1),
for v ∈ V , β, σ ∈ (0, 1),  > 0 but small enough (see
following theorem for convergence) and set k ← 0.
2: If a termination criterion is met then STOP. Otherwise,
communicate y(k) together with λv(k) to all slices.
3: All slices compute Lv (y(k);λ) and feedback to central
entity.
4: Compute t(k) = max{βl|l = 0, 1, 2, . . . } such that if we
assume ξ(k) = (Lv (y(k);λ(k)) : v ∈ V)− y(k):
Ω(y(k)+t(k)ξ(k)) ≤ Ω(y(k))−σ(t(k))2‖ξ(k)‖. (26)
Then set y(k + 1) = y(k) + t(k)ξ(k).
5: Set I(k) = {v|hv(y(k)) > 0}. For every v ∈ I(k), if
exv(k) > ηv(λv‖∇yvhvy(k))‖), (27)
then λv(k+1)← 2λv(k). Set k ← k+1. Broadcast y(k)
and λ(k) to slices and go to step 2.
Theorem 4. Let {y(k)} be the sequence of admission control
decisions generated by Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2, then
every limit point of this sequence is a Nash equilibrium of the
traffic shaping game induced by ACv .
Proof. First we need to verify the Assumption 5.1 in [29] to
guarantee that for a given λ, step 4 in Algorithm 2 converges
to a Nash equilibrium. The non-constant part of Ψ(y,y′;λ)
(defined in [29]) when y′ is fixed is:
∑
v e
xv +λv[hv(y)]+−

2‖xv − x′v‖2. If  is small enough, the concavity of the last
term will be canceled out by exv . Then the non-constant part
is always convex in y. Hence, the Assumption 5.1 holds true
together with the propositions 2.1(a) - (d) in [29]. Therefore,
the proposed algorithm generates Nash equilibrium of the
game.
One can easily verify that the EMFCQ condition given by
Definition 2.7 in [14] is satisfied. Thus for all v, λv gets
updated a finite number of times. According to Theorem 2.5
in [14], the claim is true.
B. Characterization of Traffic Shaping Equilibrium
Next we study the characteristics of the resulting traffic
shaping Nash equilibrium. To make this tractable we consider
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networks which are saturated and subsequently (in Section VI)
provide simulations to evaluate other settings.
Assumption 3. (Saturated Regime) Suppose the system is such
that for each network slice, the optimal admission control for
both SCPF and SS 2 in response to other slices’ loads is such
that for all v ∈ V , av ≺ 1.
Assumption 3 depends on many factors including the BTD
constraints, the mobility patterns, and network slices’ shares,
but it is generally true when the exogenous traffic of all slices
at all base stations γvb is high. When this is the case we have
the following result:
Theorem 5. Under Assumptions 1, 2 and 3, the relative load
distributions at the Nash equilibrium of the traffic shaping
game ρ˜∗ , (ρ˜v,∗ : v ∈ V) are the unique solution to:
min
(ρ˜v∈Γv :v∈V)
‖
∑
v
svρ˜v‖22 +
∑
v
(sv)2‖ρ˜v‖22, (28)
where Γv , { ρ˜v | 〈1, ρ˜v〉 = 1,Mvρ˜v  0 }, and the
associated carried load for slice v is ρv,∗ = s
v(d˜v−1)
〈g˜∗,ρ˜v,∗〉 , where
g˜∗ corresponds to the overall share weighted relative loads
distributions at the equilibrium.
See appendix for detailed proof.
The first term in the objective function in Eq. (28) rewards
balancing the overall share weighted relative loads on network.
The second term rewards a slice for balancing its own relative
loads. The Nash equilibrium in the saturated regime is thus a
compromise between those two objectives while constrained
by the network slices mobility patterns and feasible admission
control policies. Note that as long as ρ˜vb > 0,∀v ∈ V, b ∈ B,
GPS and SS are approximately the same under heavy load.
Therefore, we use SS as the benchmark to characterize the
carried load at the Nash equilibrium under SCPF.
Admission control for slice v under SS (ACSSv): Under
SS slice v can determine its optimal admission control yv by
solving:
max
ρ˜v,ρv
ρv
s.t. av = ρvMvρ˜v, av ∈ [0, 1]B
〈1, ρ˜v〉 = 1 and ρv‖ρ˜v‖22 ≤ (svd˜v − 1).
Note slices’ admission control decisions are clearly decoupled
under SS, but paralleling Theorem 5 we have following result.
Theorem 6. Under Assumptions 1 and 3, the optimal admis-
sion control policy under SS are decoupled. The optimal choice
for slice v, ρ˜v,SS,∗, is the unique solution to:
min
ρ˜v∈Γv
‖ρ˜v‖22, (29)
and the associated carried load is given by ρv,SS,∗ =
sv d˜v−1
‖ρ˜v,SS,∗‖22 .
See appendix for detailed proof.
2Admission control under SS is defined in the sequel.
By comparing Eq. (28) and Eq. (29), one can see that under
SS, slices simply seek to balance their own relative loads on
the network. By taking the ratio between ρ∗v and ρ
SS,∗
v given
in Theorem 5 and 6, one can show that under Assumptions 1,
2, and 3 the gain in carried load for slice v is given by
Gloadv ,
ρv,∗
ρv,SS,∗
=
‖ρ˜v,SS,∗‖22
〈g˜∗, ρ˜v,∗〉 ×
sv(d˜v − 1)
svd˜v − 1
. (30)
The first factor captures a traffic shaping dependent gain for
slice v. The second factor is a result of statistical multiplexing
gains. A simple special case is highlighted in the following
corollary.
Corollary 4. Under Assumptions 1, 2 and 3, if user mobility
patterns are such that 1B1 ∈ Γv for all v ∈ V , the gain in
the total carried load under the SCPF traffic shaping Nash
equilibrium vs. optimal admission control for SS is given by:
Gloadv =
svd˜v − sv
svd˜v − 1
≥ 1, ∀v ∈ V. (31)
See appendix for detailed proof.
Note that in order for a BTD constraint to be feasible under
SS, one must require svd˜v > 1. It can be seen that the gain
exhibited in Corollary 4 can be very high when sv ↓ 1/d˜v .
Furthermore, if sv ↑ 1 we have that Gloadv ↓ 1, i.e., no actual
gain. This result implies that slices with small shares or tight
BTD constraints will benefit most from sharing, coinciding
with our observations in Corollary 1.
VI. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION RESULTS
In this section, we validate theoretical results in previous
sections, and provide quantitative characterizations via nu-
merical experiments. We simulated a wireless network shared
by multiple slices supporting mobile customers following the
IMT-Advanced evaluation guidelines [18]. The system consists
of 19 base stations in a hexagonal cell layout with an inter
site distance of 200 meters and 3 sector antennas, mimicking
a dense ‘small cell’ deployment. Thus, in this system, B
corresponds to 57 sectors. Users associate to the sector offering
the strongest SINR, where the downlink SINR is modeled as
in [31]:
SINRub =
PbGub∑
k∈B,k 6=b PkGuk + σ2
,
where, following [18], the noise σ2 = −104dB, the transmit
power Pb = 41dB and the channel gain between user u and BS
sector b, denoted by Gub, accounts for path loss, shadowing,
fast fading and antenna gain. Letting dub denote the current
distance in meters from the user u to sector b, the path loss
is defined as 36.7 log10(dub) + 22.7 + 26 log10(fc)dB, for a
carrier frequency fc = 2.5GHz. The antenna gain is set to 17
dBi, shadowing is updated every second and modeled by a log-
normal distribution with standard deviation of 8dB, as in [31];
and fast fading follows a Rayleigh distribution depending on
the mobile’s speed and the angle of incidence. The downlink
rate cu currently achievable to user u is based on discrete set
modulation and coding schemes (MCS) and associated SINR
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Scenario Slices Spatial loads ‖ρ˜v‖2 ‖g˜‖2 θ(g˜, ρ˜v) GSS,Hv
1 Homogeneous uniform. 0.27 0.27 7.09 1.01
2 Homogeneous non-uniform 0.32 0.32 6.18 1.01
3 Heterogeneous orthogonal 0.36 0.26 41.78 1.83
4 Mixed Slices 1&2 non-uniform 0.36 0.23 25.52 1.70
3&4 uniform 0.19 0.23 48.00 1.24
TABLE II: Measured normalized slice and network traffic
norms and angles for highest load case of each scenario.
Fig. 1: Snapshot of users positions per slice and scenario
exhibiting the different characteristics of traffic spatial loads.
Left to right: Scenarios 1 to 4.
thresholds given in [3]. This MCS value is selected based on
the averaged SINRub, where channel fast fading is averaged
over a second.
We model slices’ with different spatial loads by modeling
different customer mobility patterns. Roughly uniform spatial
loads are obtained by simulating the Random Waypoint model
[17], while non-uniform loads obtained by simulating the
SLAW model [21]. Instead of the open network assumed in
the theoretical analysis, in the simulations we use a closed
network where the total number of users on each slice keeps
fixed. Moreover, the simulated mobility models would not
induce Markovian motion amongst base stations assumed in
our analysis, yet the analytical results are robust to these
assumptions.
A. Statistical Multiplexing and BTD Gains
We evaluated the BTD gains of SCPF vs. both SS and
GPS for four simulation scenarios, each including 4 slices,
each with equal shares but different spatial load patterns.
For each scenario, we provide results for simulated BTD
gains, and results from our theoretical analysis (Corollary 1
and Corollary 2) based on the empirically obtained spatial
traffic loads. More detailed information regarding simulated
scenarios and resulting empirical spatial traffic loads for high
load regime are displayed in Table II and a snapshot of
locations for the 4 slices’ users in a network with a load of 4
users per sector is displayed in Figure 1.
The results given in Figure 2 show the BTD gains over
SS for each scenario as the overall network load increases. In
Scenario 3, the aggregate network traffic is ‘smoother’ than the
individual slice’s traffic, and the gains are indeed higher. This
is also the case for Slice 1 and 2 in Scenario 4, since these
slices loads are more ‘imbalanced’ than the other two slices,
they experience higher gains. In Scenario 2, where slices non-
homogenous spatial loads are ‘aligned’, aggregation does not
lead to smoothing and the gains are least.
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Fig. 2: BTD gain over SS for our 4 different scenarios.
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Fig. 3: BTD gain over GPS for our 4 different scenarios.
Fig. 4: BTD vs. time for a randomly picked user under
Scenario 3
Similarly, the results given in Figure 3 show the BTD
gains over GPS for each scenario as the overall network
load increases. As can be seen, the gain is not necessarily
monotonic in the load. In Scenario 4, the Slice 1 and 2 have
significant gains because their loads are more imbalanced,
while Slice 3 and 4 see negative gains. However, the overall
gain defined in Eq. (13) is still positive, ranging from 1.26 to
1.5 for varying overall load.
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Subfigure: Balancing in relative load.
As can be seen in Figures 2 and 3 the simulated and
theoretical gains (dashed lines) of Corollary 1 are an excellent
match. The theoretical model has been calibrated to the mean
reciprocal capacities seen by slice customers (i.e., δvb ’s) and
the measured induced loads resulting from the slice mobility
patterns.
In addition to performance averaged over time, to illustrate
the dynamic of the BTD perceived by a typical user, we plot
the BTD vs. time for a randomly picked user on Slice 1 in
Scenario 1, as shown in Fig. 4, where the left/right part is
under light/heavy load regime, respectively. Note that under
heavy load, GPS and SS are approximately the same. SCPF
outperforms for most of the time. Under light load, the mean
BTD under SCPF is 4.2044, while that under SS (GPS) is
6.6157 (5.2862), respectively. The standard deviation of BTD
under SS (GPS) is 3.9011 (3.0449), and SCPF reduces it to
1.93. Similar phenomenon is observed under heavy load, when
both SS and GPS provide mean BTD of 19.65 and associated
standard deviation of 13.79, SCPF reduce them to 16.79 and
13.45, respectively. Therefore, SCPF can effectively improve
the perceived BTD and also ‘smooth’ the user perceived QoS.
B. Traffic Shaping Equilibrium and Carried Load Gains
In order to study the equilibria reached by the traffic shaping
game, we measured the underlying user mobility patterns in
Section VI-A, and modeled it via a random routing matrix.
We further assumed uniform intensity of arrivals rates at
all base stations and uniform exit probabilities of 0.1. The
mean holding time at each base station was again calibrated
with the simulations in Section VI-A. We considered a traffic
shaping game for a network shared by 3 slices, where Slice
1 has uniform spatial loads and Slice 2 and 3 have differ-
ent non-uniform spatial loads. All slices have equal shares
and their capacity normalized BTD requirements are set to
d˜1 = 10, d˜2 = 12, d˜3 = 15 respectively. The Nash equilibrium
was solved via the algorithm included in Section V-A. The
convergence is reached within 3 rounds of iterations under the
parameters ηv = β = 0.5,∀v ∈ V , σ = 0.1,  = 0.01. The
results shown in Figure 5 exhibit dashed lines corresponding
to the theoretical carried load gains in the saturated regime.
As can be seen, these coincide with the Nash equilibria of
the simulated traffic shaping games for high arrival rates. For
lower arrival rates the gains can be much higher, e.g., almost
a factor of 1.6, for slices with non-uniform mobility patterns.
This was to be expected since for lower loads we expect higher
statistical multiplexing gains from sharing, and thus relatively
higher carried loads to be admitted. For very low loads, as
expected, there are no gains since all traffic can be admitted
and BTD constraints are met.
Also shown in Figure 5(subfigure) is the degree to which
the relative loads of slices, and the weighted aggregate traffic
on the network g˜ are balanced, as measured by || · ||2, as the
arrival rates on the network increase. As expected, based on
Theorem 5, as arrivals increase relative loads of slices and the
network become more balanced, showing the compromise the
traffic shaping game is making, balancing slices relative loads
and that of the overall network.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
This paper has thoroughly explored a relatively simple and
natural approach for resource sharing amongst network slices
– SCPF – which corresponds to socially optimal allocations in
a Fisher market. Our analysis of performance in settings where
slices support stochastic loads provides explicit formulas for
(i) the performance gains one can expect over SS and GPS, (ii)
how to dimension slice shares to meet performance objectives,
and (iii) how to go about performance management through
admission control. If dynamic resource sharing amongst net-
work slices is to be adopted, the ability to realize disciplined
engineering and performance prediction will be the key. Our
analysis of SCPF seems to meet these requirements and at the
same time reveals some intriguing insights regarding the load
interactions in such sharing models, in particular the impact of
relative load distributions on statistical multiplexing, and the
role of traffic shaping in optimizing admission control. Finally,
we note that our approach to admission control in an SCPF
shared system is novel in that each slice exploits knowledge
of its customers’ mobility patterns to optimize its carried load
and assure service continuity.
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VIII. APPENDIX
A. Proof of Theorem 1
Proof. Recall that Poisson arrivals see time averages, i.e., see
the remaining users in the product-form stationary distribution,
given in Section II-A. Thus the distribution as seen by a typical
user on slice v at base station b is the same as the product-
form distribution plus an additional customer on slice v at
base station b. Using this fact and SCPF resource allocations
as given by Eq. (3), the mean BTD of a typical slice v user
at base station b can be expressed as follows:
Ev
[
1
Rvb
]
= Ev
[
1
Cvb
]
E

sv
Nvb +1
Nv+1 +
∑
v′ 6=v
sv
′
Nv
′
b
Nv′
1{Nv′>0}
sv
(Nv+1)

= δvbE
(Nvb + 1) + Nv + 1sv ∑
v′ 6=v
sv
′
Nv
′
b
Nv′
1{Nv′>0}

= δvb (ρ
v
b + 1 +
ρv + 1
sv
∑
v′ 6=v
sv
′
(1− eρv
′
)ρ˜v
′
b )
= δvb (1− ρ˜vb +
(ρv + 1)
sv
g˜′b + (ρ
v + 1)e−ρ
v
ρ˜vb ),
where the second equality follows by noticing that (i) Nv
is independent of Nv
′
b and N
v′ and (ii) E[N
v′
b
Nv′
1{Nv′>0}] =
P (Nv
′
> 0)E[
Nv
′
b
Nv′
|Nv′ > 0] = ρv
′
b
ρv′
P (Nv
′
> 0). The latter
result is given by the following lemma:
Lemma 1. If N1, N2, . . . , Nn are independent Poisson ran-
dom variables, such that Ni ∼ Poisson(ρi), i = 1, 2, . . . , n.
Then for all i we have that:
E
 Ni∑n
j=1Nj
|
n∑
j=1
Nj > 0
 = ρi∑n
j=1 ρj
Proof. Suppose all ρi’s are rational, and for some  small
enough, for all i, we have that mi = ρi is integer valued.
Let Xi,j , i = 1, . . . , n, j = 1, . . . ,mi be i.i.d. Poisson random
variables with parameter . Since Poisson random variables
are infinitely divisible we have that Ni ∼
∑mi
j=1Xi,j . Then
E
 Ni∑n
j=1Nj
|
n∑
j=1
Nj > 0

= E
 ∑mij=1Xi,j∑n
i=1
∑mi
j=1Xi,j
|
n∑
j=1
Nj > 0

= mi · E
 Xi,1∑n
i=1
∑mi
j=1Xi,j
|
n∑
j=1
Nj > 0

=
mi∑n
j=1mj
=
ρi∑n
j=1 ρj
,
where the second and third equalities follow from the sym-
metry among Xi,j . Since the conditional expectation will be
a continuous function of the parameter vector ρ, the equality
follows more generally for the case where ρ is a real valued
vector.
The asymptotic form given in Eq. (5) follows by noting
that when ρv is large for all v ∈ V , g˜′ u g˜, and only the term
scaling with ρv matters.
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Under static slicing we have that for a typical user on slice
v at base station b,
Ev
[
1
Rv,SSb
]
= Ev
[
1
Cvb
]
E
[
Nvb + 1
sv
]
= δvb
ρvb + 1
sv
.
Similarly, under GPS we have that,
Ev
[
1
Rv,GPS
]
= Ev
[
1
Cvb
]
Ev
N
v
b
∑
v′∈V
sv
′
1{Nv′b >0}
sv

= δvb
(
ρvb + 1
sv
)
(1− s¯vb ) .
The theorem follows by taking a weighted average across
base stations – weighted by the fraction of customers at each
base station, i.e., ρ˜vb .
B. Proof of Corollary 1
From Theorem 1 we have that for SCPF
Ev
[
1
Rv
]
= 〈δv, ρ˜v〉 −
(
1− (ρv + 1)e−ρv
)
‖ρ˜v‖2∆v
+
ρv + 1
sv
〈g˜′, ρ˜v〉∆v , (32)
while for SS we have that
Ev
[
1
Rv,SS
]
=
1
sv
(
ρv‖ρ˜v‖2∆v + 〈δv, ρ˜v〉
)
. (33)
Taking the ratio of the overall mean BTDs we have Eq. (8) in
Corollary 1.
Now setting ρv = 0, it is easy to see that
GSS,Lv =
〈δv, ρ˜v〉
sv〈δv, ρ˜v〉+ 〈g˜′, ρ˜v〉∆v
=
1
sv + 〈g˜
′,ρ˜v〉∆v
〈δv,ρ˜v〉
≥ 1
sv + 1− sv = 1,
Note that when ρv u 0, g˜′b ≈
∑
v′ 6=v s
v′(1 − e−ρv′ )ρ˜v′b .
Therefore, the inequality follows from
〈g˜′, ρ˜v〉∆v
〈δv, ρ˜v〉 =
∑
b∈B
(∑
v′ 6=v s
v′
(
1− e−ρv′
)
ρ˜v
′
b
)
δvb ρ˜
v
b∑
b∈B δ
v
b ρ˜
v
b
≤
∑
b∈B
(∑
v′ 6=v s
v′ ρ˜v
′
b
)
δvb ρ˜
v
b∑
b∈B δ
v
b ρ˜
v
b
≤
∑
v′ 6=v s
v′
(∑
b∈B ρ˜
v
bδ
v
b
)∑
b∈B δ
v
b ρ˜
v
b
= 1− sv.
The last inequality follows from swapping the order of sum-
mation and ρ˜v
′
b ≤ 1,∀b ∈ B, v′ ∈ V .
Let g˜′−v =
∑
v′ 6=v s
v′(1−e−ρv′ )ρ˜v′ +svρ˜v . Eq. (8) can be
written as:
GSSv =
‖ρ˜v‖2∆v
〈g˜′−v, ρ˜v〉∆v
+〈δv, ρ˜v〉
1−
(
‖ρ˜v‖2
∆v
〈δv,ρ˜v〉 +(1−
‖ρ˜v‖2
∆v
〈δv,ρ˜v〉 )
sv‖ρ˜v‖2
∆v
〈g˜′−v,ρ˜v〉∆v
)
(ρv+1)〈g˜′−v,ρ˜v〉∆v+sv(〈δv,ρ˜v〉−‖ρ˜v‖2∆v )
. (34)
Note that 〈δv, ρ˜v〉 ≥ ‖ρ˜v‖2∆v . Then because s
v‖ρ˜v‖2∆v
〈g˜′−v,ρ˜v〉∆v ≤
1, the numerator of the second term is nonnegative. Therefore,
GSSv is decreasing in ρ
v . When ρv →∞,∀v ∈ V , the second
term in Eq. (34) vanishes, and g˜′−v → g˜. Then GSS,Hv is given
by
GSS,Hv =
‖ρ˜v‖2∆v
〈g˜, ρ˜v〉∆v . (35)
C. Proof of Corollary 2
The BTD under SCPF is given in Eq. (32). Similarly for
GPS we have that
Ev
[
1
Rv,GPS
]
=
1
sv
[
ρv(‖ρ˜v‖2∆v − ‖ρ˜v‖2∆vSv ) + 〈ρ˜v,1− s¯v〉∆v
]
. (36)
Taking the ratio of the overall mean BTDs gives Eq. (9).
Setting ρv = 0, we have that
GGPS,Lv =
〈ρ˜v,1− s¯v〉∆v
sv〈δv, ρ˜v〉+ 〈g˜′, ρ˜v〉∆v .
If we further have ρv → 0,∀v ∈ V , then g˜′ → 0 and
GGPS,Lv =
〈ρ˜v,1− s¯v〉∆v
sv〈δv, ρ˜v〉
=
〈δv, ρ˜v〉 − (1− sv)〈δv, ρ˜v〉
sv〈δv, ρ˜v〉 = 1
When ρv → ∞,∀v ∈ V , all the terms without ρv vanishes
and the gain becomes
GGPS,Hv →
‖ρ˜v‖2∆v − ‖ρ˜v‖2∆vSv
〈g˜, ρ˜v〉∆v .
Note that even we have ρv → ∞, we cannot guarantee that
ρvb → ∞,∀b ∈ B if for some b ∈ B, ρ˜vb = 0. Thus ‖ρ˜v‖2Sv
might not approach 0.
D. Proof of Corollary 3
From Theorem 1, one can express the overall weighted BTD
gain over SS under heavy load as
GSS,Hall =
∑
v s
v‖ρ˜v‖22∑
v s
v〈g˜, ρ˜v〉 =
∑
v
∑
b s
v(ρ˜vb )
2∑
v s
v
∑
b(
∑
v′ s
v′ ρ˜v
′
b )ρ˜
v
b
=
∑
b
∑
v s
v(ρ˜vb )
2∑
b(
∑
v′ s
v′ ρ˜v
′
b )(
∑
v s
vρ˜vb )
=
∑
b
∑
v s
v(ρ˜vb )
2∑
b(
∑
v s
vρ˜vb )
2
.
According to Jensen’s inequality, we have ∀b ∈ B,∑
v s
v(ρ˜vb )
2 ≥ (∑v svρ˜vb )2. Thus GSSall ≥ 1.
Similarly, for GPS, we have
GGPS,Hall =
∑
v
∑
b s
v(ρ˜vb )
2
(
1−∑v′ 6=v sv′e−ρv′b )∑
v
∑
b s
vρ˜vb
∑
v′ s
v′ ρ˜v
′
b
=
∑
b
∑
v s
v(ρ˜vb )
2 −∑b∑v sv(ρ˜vb )2∑v′ 6=v sv′e−ρv′b∑
b(
∑
v s
vρ˜vb )
2
.
As ρv →∞, for each base station b ∈ B, if ρvb →∞, e−ρ
v
b →
0, otherwise ρ˜vb =
ρvb
ρv → 0. Based on such observation, let us
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define a set of slices at each base station b, whose local loads
approach infinity, V infb , {v ∈ V : ρvb →∞}. Then the above
equation can be rewritten as:
GGPS,Hall =
∑
b
(∑
v∈V inf
b
sv(ρ˜vb )
2(1−∑
v′ /∈V inf
b
sv
′
e−ρ
v′
b )
)
∑
b(
∑
v∈V inf
b
sv ρ˜vb )
2
=
∑
b
(
(1−∑
v′ /∈V inf
b
sv
′
e−ρ
v′
b )(
∑
v∈V inf
b
sv)
∑
v∈V inf
b
s˜v(ρ˜vb )
2
)
∑
b(
∑
v∈V inf
b
sv)2(
∑
v∈V inf
b
s˜v ρ˜vb )
2 ,
where for v ∈ V infb , s˜v , s
v∑
v∈V inf
b
sv . Therefore
∑
v∈V infb s˜
v = 1.
Now for each base station b ∈ B, we have
(1−∑v′ /∈V infb sv′e−ρv′b )(∑v∈V infb sv)∑v∈V infb s˜v(ρ˜vb )2
(
∑
v∈V infb s
v)2(
∑
v∈V infb s˜
vρ˜vb )
2
=
(1−∑v/∈V infb sve−ρvb )∑v∈V infb s˜v(ρ˜vb )2
(
∑
v∈V infb s
v)(
∑
v∈V infb s˜
vρ˜vb )
2
≥
(1−∑v/∈V infb sv)∑v∈V infb s˜v(ρ˜vb )2
(
∑
v∈V infb s
v)(
∑
v∈V infb s˜
vρ˜vb )
2
=
∑
v∈V infb s˜
v(ρ˜vb )
2
(
∑
v∈V infb s˜
vρ˜vb )
2
,
where the last equality holds true because
∑
v s
v = 1. Then
by Jensen’s inequality, for all b ∈ B, the above ratio is no less
than 1, thus GGPS,Hall ≥ 1.
E. Proof of Theorem 5
Under the saturated regime, BTD constraint of each v ∈ V
must be binding because we are blocking traffics. Thus we
have:
xv =
fv(ρ˜
v; ρ˜−v)
sv(d˜v − 1)
, (37)
Also assumption 3 guarantees that for all v ∈ V ,Mvρ˜v  xv1
is not binding then the ACv can be reformulated as:
min
ρ˜v∈Γv
svfv(ρ˜
v; ρ˜−v), (38)
A constant factor sv in the objective function has no impact to
the minimizer. We can show that the optimality condition of
Problem (28) is the same as each slice v optimizing its own
problem given by Eq. (38). Dividing the objective function by
2, the Lagrangian of Problem (28) is:
L(ρ˜; ζ,χ) =
1
2
(‖
∑
v
svρ˜v‖22 +
∑
v
(sv)2‖ρ˜v‖22)
+
∑
v∈V
ζv(〈1, ρ˜v〉 − 1)−
∑
v∈V
(χv)TMvρ˜
v, (39)
where ρ˜ , (ρ˜v : v ∈ V), dual variables ζ , (ζv : v ∈ V),
and χ , (χv : v ∈ V). According to the KKT condition, the
solution ρ˜∗ must be such that, for all v ∈ V:
∇ρ˜vL(ρ∗; ζ∗,χ∗) = (sv)2ρ˜v,∗ + svg˜ + ζ∗v1− (Mv)Tχv,∗
= 0, (40)
and χv,∗  0, ρ˜v,∗ ∈ Γv. The Lagrangian of Problem (38) is:
Lv(ρ˜
v; ζv,χ
v) = 〈g˜, svρ˜v〉
+ζv(〈1, ρ˜v〉 − 1)− (χv)TMvρ˜v. (41)
If slice v’s relative load ρ˜v,∗ optimizes Problem (38) given
other slices’ ρ˜−v,∗, following KKT condition should be met:
∇ρ˜v,∗Lv(ρ˜v,∗; ζ∗v ,χv,∗) = (sv)2ρ˜v,∗ + svg˜
+ζ∗v1− (M−1v )Tχv,∗ = 0, (42)
and χv,∗  0, ρ˜v,∗ ∈ Γv, which is exactly the same as the
KKT condition of Problem (28). Therefore, Problem (28) is
solved at the Nash equilibrium. Moreover, we could compute
the total carried load of slice v by setting
fv(ρ˜
v,∗; ρ˜−v,∗) = sv(d˜v − 1)/ρv,∗,
which gives us ρv,∗ = s
v(d˜v−1)
〈g˜∗,ρ˜v,∗〉 .
F. Proof of Theorem 6
Under the saturated regime, BTD constraint of each v ∈ V
must be binding. Thus we have:
ρv =
svd˜v − 1
‖ρ˜v‖22
.
Moreover, the constraint av  1 should be satisfied with strict
inequality, thus the optimal policy ρ˜v,SS,∗ under SS is given
by:
min
ρ˜v
{ ‖ρ˜v‖22 | Mvρ˜v  0, 〈1, ρ˜v〉 = 1}.
Then the optimal load is obtained by plugging the result in
the BTD constraint.
G. Proof of Corollary 4
Under SS, it is obvious that the optimal relative load
distribution of slice v is
ρ˜v,SS,∗ =
1
B
1
Plugging it in the BTD constraint one can get ρv,SS,∗ =
B(svd˜v − 1), thus ρv,SS,∗ = (svd˜v − 1)1.
Dividing the objective function by sv and discarding the
routing constraints, the Lagrangian of Eq. (38) is:
〈g˜v, ρ˜v〉+ ν(〈1, ρ˜v〉 − 1),
where ν is the dual variable. Solving its KKT condition we
have:
ρ˜v,∗ = − 1
2sv
(ν1 +
∑
v′ 6=v
sv′ ρ˜
v′). (43)
Substituting in 〈1, ρ˜v,∗〉 = 1 we have ν = − sv+1B .
When 1B1 ∈ Γv,∀v ∈ V , Eq. (43) implies that if all
other slices v′ 6= v pick their relative loads as 1B1, then
(
∑
v′ 6=v s
v′ ρ˜v
′
) ‖ 1, meaning that this is the Nash equilibrium
of the game. Note that since ρ˜v,∗ is feasible and optimal for
a relaxed feasible set, it will still be optimal if we put back
the routing constraints. Thus we have that: 〈g˜∗, ρ˜v,∗〉 = 1B .
Then the carried load gain is obtained by plugging the result
in Eq. (30).
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